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The treatment of political offenses properly begins with a considera-
tion of the offense of treason.' For reasons noticed herein, treason itself
presents no great problem at the present time, and its development may
therefore be summarized briefly.
By the English common law what constituted treason became very
largely a matter -of judicial discretion, or indiscretion, the royal judges
arbitrarily extending it to cover a vast field of constructive treasons so
that it became more and more extensive and uncertain in scope, engender-
ing by its oppression both fear and hatred. The clamor for relief from
its operation subsequently resulted in an English statute' defining and
limiting its application to specified classes of acts, only two of which were
retained by the American constitutional fathers in framing an even more
stringent definition for the people of this country, which definition pro-
vided:
"Treason against the United States. shall consist only in
levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving
them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason
unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt
Act, or on Confession in open Court."'
MNany state constitutions similarly limit the offense of treason as a
state offense. 4  Moreover, judicial construction, both state and federal,
has generally served to limit rather than extend the scope of the offense.
Although early decisions inclined to the view that forcible resistance to
*Assistant Professor of Law, University of Idaho. A.B., 1936, Southwestern
State Teachers College (Old.); LL.B., 1935, University of Oklahoma; J.S.D.,
1938, Yale University.
1. As used herein, treason means the offense of high treason, as dis-
tinguished from petit treason, modern criminal law abolishing the latter as an
offense except as included in the homicide category.
2. 25 Edw. III, St. 5, c. 2.
3. U. S. CONST. Art. III, § 3. The last sentence of the section, dealing with
Congressional power to punish treason, and forbidding corruption of blood, is not
quoted. The federal statutes on treason and misprision of treason were passed
in 1790 and survive today. REv. STAT. §§ 5331-5333 (1875), 18 U. S. C. §§ 1-3
(1934). See McKinney, Treason Under the Constitution of the United Staten
(1918) 12 ILL. L. REV. 381.
4. For typical state provisions, see OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 16; GA. CONST.
art. I, §§ 2-202; N. C. CONST. art. IV, § 5.
(164)
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a particular statute would constitute treason,5 subsequent opinions and
statutes have argued that even an actual armed movement, where directed
merely against a particular statute or person or group of enlorcement
officers, and not for the purpose of overthrowing the federal government
or forcibly overthrowing the Constitution, is not treason agaiiist the
United States, however great another offense it may be,' and the same rule
holds true, mutatis mutandis, as to treason against a state.7 'This "levy-
ing war" requires an overt act of war and not a mere conspiracy to
levy war. and such war must be directed against the government, and
not be mere forcible resistance against a statute or government troops
seeking to enforce it.' "Adhering to enemies" has been construed to cover
almost all friendly relations with the enemy, but not with rebellious citi-
zens of this country.
9
Treason against the state is said to include all common-law treason
of waging war against the government except that which is distinctly
aimed at federal authority,"0 state treason being separable from treason
against the federal government, and not merged in the latter.' ' Treason
against a state is not necessarily treason against the United States, nor
is treason against the United States an offense against the state,'2 in the
absence of the state definition of treason expressly so providing.l..
Thus the scope of the offense of treason seems rather well defined,
with little threat of its extension, at least under that name. There has
been a trend toward an extension of political offenses, but in the form
5. United States v. Vigol, 2 Dall. 346 (U. S. 1795); United States v.
Mitchell, 2 Dall. 348 (U. S 1795) (riots aimed not against a particular official
as an individual but against the enforcement of the excise statute generally).
6. 3 WHARTON, CRIMINAL LAw (12th ed. 1932) § 2160. Compare United
States v. Hanway, 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,299 (C. C. E. D. Pa. 1851), which concedes
that armed resistance to a particular official or against a particular statute for a
personal reason is not treason, but asserts that if the resistance is for a general
purpose it is treason although directed against a particular statute and not in-
cluding an intent to completely overthrow the government.
7. 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2159; but see Homestead Case, 1
Pa. Dist. 785 (1892) (grand jury charge).
S. Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout, 4 Crar-ch 75 (U. S. 1807); MILLER,
CRIMINAL LAw (1934) § 172.
9. See United States v. Greathouse, 26 Fed. Cas. Nc.. 15,254 (C. C. N. D.
Cal. 1863); cf. The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1862). MILLER, op. cit. supra
note 8, § 172 (d); Warren, What is Giving Aid and Comfort to the Enemy?(1918) 27 YALE L. J. 331.
10. 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2179 (citing Story's Charge to Grand
Jury, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,275 (C. C. R. I. 1842). See similar charges, 30 Fed. Cas.
Nos. 18,270 to 18,277, inclusive.
11. 3 WHARTON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 2181.
12. People v. Lynch, 11 Johns. 549 (N. Y. 1814); cf. 4 Am. L. Mag. 318; 3
WHARTON, Op. cit. supra note 6, § 2178.
13. PA. STAT. (Purdon, 1936) tit. 18, § 143 (levying war and assisting
enemies of the state or the United States is a high misdemeanor).
1940]
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of other designated offenses, the validily of which has beeii determined
independently of the treason limitation, by reference to olher constitu-
tional provisions and, if the thesis of this study be accepted, by the whole
current of contemporary thought.
It is hardly necessary to observe that many of the ofl'enss defined
by these different statutes consist of acts which once were considered as
constituting treason, and against which the constitutional limitation might
be said to have been directed. Strict construction of the definition of
treason has not prevented punishment of offenses under these statutes,
but on the contrary, the enactment of the latter statutes has probahly
been responsible in part for the continued strict limitations upon treason
prosecutions. 4 It is obviously arguable that such statutes violate the
constitutional provision as to treason,' 5 but such arguments have met with
very little success. Thus, in Berg v. State,"0 the Oklahoma Criminal Syn-
dicalisin statute was held not to violate the limitations placed upon
treason prosecutions by the Oklahoma constitution. In Froh work 1. Un1ited
8tatcs',1" in denying a similar argument made with reference to the Es-
pionage Act of 1917, the court said " it was suggested
that some of the matters dealt with in the Act of 1917 were treasonable and
punishable as treason or not at all, and . . . that the acts complained
of not being treason could not be punished. These suiggestions seent to uts
to need no more than to be stated.'" Again, in Wimrner v. United
14. The same conclusion is indicated in the statement: "If Congress had not
enacted the Espionage Act or some equivalent measure, it is likely that the
Government would have had frequent recourse, in endeavoring to repress dis-
loyalty, to the statutes punishing treason, and that consequently the constitu-
tional definition of treason would have received further elucidation from the
Courts." Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War Tine: The
Espionage Act (1919) 17 MICH. L. REV. 621, 660.
15. See Note (1919) 32 HARV. L. Rnv. 724, in which the Act of Feb. 14,
1917, c. 64, 39 Stat. 919, 18 U. S. C. § 89, making it an offense to threaten the
life of the President, is discussed. Note the statement at page 725: "Th- federal
statute doubtless finds its ancestry in the Statute of Treason, which made it
criminal 'to compass and imagine the death of the King.'"
16. 29 Okla. Cr. 112, 233 Pac. 497 (1925).
17. 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
18. Id. at 210. Italics supplied. Accord: Ex parte Bollman and Swartwout,
4 Cranch 75, 126 (U. S. 1807); State v. Hennessy, 114 Wash. 351, 195 Pac. 211
(1921); State v. Moilen, 140 Minn. 112, 167 N. W. 345 (1918). Cf. People v.
Steelik, 187 Cal. 361, 203 Pac. 78 (1921), in which the court said that the defini-
tions of treason in the state and Federal Constitutions were merely for purposes
of limiting the number of offenses which could be punished as treason under
the common law, and in no wise limited the power of the legislature to provide
for the punishment of acts inimical to the public welfare which theretofore might
have been punished as constructive treason. Notice the Proclamation of April 16,
1917, stating that the courts of the United States had declared to be treasonable
various enumerated acts, including the "use or attempted use of any force or
violence against the Government of the United States, or its military or naval
forces." 18 U. S. C. A. § 1, note (1927). 3
Million: Million: Political Crimes
Published by Univ rsity of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1940
POLITICAL CRIME',
States," a conviction under the Espionage Act was affirmed despite the
defendant's contention that the Act violated the treason provisions.
Said the court:
"Treason requires both adherence and giving aid. To ' favor
or support' is, very likely, to 'adhere'; but it does not carry the
idea of giving aid and comfort, unless by a rather remote i,,mpli-
cation. Hence it may well be said that adherence by words oidI.
is an offense quite distinct from treason. ''1
The refusal of the courts to outlaw the statutes by referen.,. to the
treason provision of the Constitution is not very important shi,,. tlhe
Supreme Court finds little difficulty in voiding objectionable federal stal-
utes by reference to the First Amendment.21 True, this guarany is not
binding on the states but by construing the due process claus, of ithe
Fourteenth Amendment to include such rights, the same result is obtained
as to state statutes,"la which must also face in the state courts a similar
Bill of Rights in the state constitution.
FEDERAL OFFENSES
In considering the political offenses other than treason, let us look
first to the federal offenses. All of the existing federal laws of this
nature were enacted in periods of intense emotional strain, either during
or immediately after the occurrence of a war. An examination of the
present statutes, together with a few important enactments already re-
pealed, should provide a better understanding, so attention is directed
to these offenses, grouped according to their period of enactment.
The Sedition Act of 1798,2-' passed during a Federalist administration
harassed by strained relations and "limited warfare" with France, de-
fined two offenses:
(1) Unlawful combination to oppose any measure of the Govern-
ment, intimidate persons from taking or performing federal office, or
advise or attempt to procure a riot or insurrection.
(2) Publication of a libel against the Government, either house of
Congress, or the President, with intent to defame or bring into dli.rcpute,
or excite against them the hatred of the people, o- stir up sedition, or
19. 264 Fed. 11 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920).
20. Id. at 13.
21. The guaranties of freedom of speech, press, and assemblage, and of
petitioning the government for redress of grievances.
21a. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
22. Act of July 14, 1798, 1 STAT. 596 (1850).
1940]
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excite unlawful combinations to resist any law, or to abet the hostile
design of any foreign nation against the United States.
Prosecutions were had principally under the second offense, which
provided a maximum penalty of two years imprisonment and a fine of
not over $2000, and which provided that truth should be a defense and
that the jury should determine the question of the criminality of the
publication.
The Act was never declared unconstitutional, although that question
was raised by the defense in more than one of the prosecutions, but
there was widespread opposition to it and fierce resentment to the
prosecutions under it. Representative Matthew Lyon, a member of
Congress, was convicted22 of libelling President Adams, and was sen-
tented to four months imprisonment and fined $1000, an action which
.aroused.his constituents to such a pitch as to lead to a popular uprising to
tear down his prison. Lyon himself succeeded in suppressing this movement,
and was re-elected to Congress while still imprisoned. In Unzited States v.
Haswell.2 4 a supporter of Lyon was convicted because of articles pub-
Iished in his paper in support of Lyon, and was sentenced to two months
imprisonment and fined $200. Even more curious is the record in United
Staths i. Cooper;5 where the prosecution was for publication of an al-
legation that President Adams had "countenanced a navy and brought
forward measures for raising a standing army." In charging the jury
Judge Chase said:
"There is -no subject on which the people of America feel
more alarm, than the establishment of a standing army. Once
persuade them that the government is attempting to promote such
a measure, and you destroy their confidence in the government. "2"
Cooper was convicted and sentenced to six months imprisonment,
fined $400, and ordered to find sureties for his good behavior thereafter!
Jefferson, a determined opponent of the sedition prosecutions, upon
becoming president issued pardons to all those still imprisoned under
the Act. It expired by its own terms March 3, 1801, but the opposition
its enactment and enforcement aroused lasted much longer..2 7  Another
23. Lyon's Case, 15 Fed. Cas. No. 8,646 (C. C. D. Vt. 1798).
24. 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,324 (C. C. D. Vt. 1800).
25. 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,865 (C. C. D. Pa. 1800).
26. Id. at 642.
27. See United States v. Callender, 25 Fed. Cas. No. 14,709 (C. C. D. Va.
1800), another prosecution and conviction under the Act, resulting in a $200 fine
and nine month imprisonment. Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time (1919)
32 HARv. L. REv. 932, at 952, observes that the Sedition Act and these prosecutions
LVol. 5
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statute enacted during the same period- declared it to be a high nisde-
meanor for any citizen, without authority of the United St al ,s Govern-
ment, to correspond with any foreign government with an intent to
influence the conduct of any foreign government or its ageni in relation
to disputes with the United States, or defeat measures of the United
States Government..2 1 Unlike the Sedition Act, this statute has remained
in force with slight alteration ever since its enactment. Ihdking allow-
ance for the differences in the two enactments, it can still be asserted
that the survival of the latter statute is due to its not having been used
as a basis for unpopular prosecutions. The reported cases contain
not even one instance of a prosecution under it. Four instances exist
where it has been cited, but always in some other connection. :-0 In none
of these has its constitutionality or desirability been questioned, and
in the one instance where it is cited by the Supreme Court, its validity
is assumed."'
The period of the Civil War also furnished a number of statutes
punisling political offenses. Several of these statutes survive today,3 -
including the two following modern forms:
(1) Inciting rebellion or insurrection.
defeated the open discussion of public affairs and aroused popular indignation
which wrecked the Federalist party. See also, Carroll, Freedom of Speech and
of the Press in the Federalist Period; The Sedition Act (1920) 18 MIcH. L. REv.
615. President Washington pardoned both Vigol and Mitchell, whose convictions
appear in note 5, supra. On July 4, 1840, a bill to pay to Lyon's legal representa-
tives the amount of the fine imposed in Lyon's Case was signed by the president,
having passed both houses. 15 Fed. Cas. p. 1191, note. "In 1844 an act passed
Congress refunding this fine to the defendant's representatives, with over forty
years' interest." 26 Fed. Ca_ p. 218, note.
28. Act of Jan. 30, 179J, c. 1, 1 STAT. 613 (1850).
29. The punishment provided was a fine not exceeding $5000 and imprison-
ment not less than 6 months nor exceeding 3 years.
30. Sprague, Dist. J., in Charge to Grand Jury-Treason, 30 Fed. Cas. No.
18,274 (D. Mass. 1863), and 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,277 (C. C. D. Mass. 1861),
directs attention to the Act as forbidding communications by citizens in Northern
states to members of the British parliament, urging recognition by England of
the independence of the Confederacy, both of these charges being given during
the Civil War. The Act is also cited in Burke v. Brotherhood, 286 Fed. 949 (D.
Md. 1922), but the case itself deals with the right o.' a union to expel one of its
members.
31. In Blackmer v. United States, 284 U. S. 421 (1932), the issue before
the court was the constitutionality of the action of the supreme court of the
District of Columbia in assessing the petitioner fines for contempt because of his
failure to answer subpoenas requiring him to appear before that court as a govern-
ment witness in a criminal trial. The subpoenas had been served upon the
petitioner while he was in France. The court cited this Act as illustrative of
Congressional acts applicable to citizens abroad. This Act applies to all citizens,
whether at home or abroad.
32. See, for less important surviving enactments of this period, 18 U. S. C.
§ 2 (1934) (punishment for treason), §§ 7, 8 (recruiting for or enlisting for
service against the United States), §§ 94, 95 (enticing desertion from Army
or Navy, or from employment in arsenal or armory). 6
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"Whoever incites, sets on foot, assists, or engages in any rebellion or
insurrection against the authority of the United States or the laws thereof,
or gives aid or comfort thereto, shall be imprisoned not more than ten
years, or fined not more than $10,000, or both; and shall, moreover, be
incapable of holding any office under the United States."'
The best known prosecution under this statute is reported in United
, tatis v. Greathouse.14 in which a conviction was had against persons se-
curing letters of marque from the Confederacy, and outfitting a ship in
California with the purpose of capturing federal merchant ships. Jus-
tice Field, in charging the jury, said that the Constitution limited the
offenses punishable as treason, and that Congress could neither expand
nor restrict the crime; that the term "enemies" did not embrace rebel-
lious citizens of the United States, hence the defendants could be guilty
of treason only if levying war (and were guilty of that offense, equally
with the rebels). Justice Field added that all the offenses mentioned in
this statute, except possibly that of "inciting," were themselves treason
so the statute merely enabled the defendants, who were in fact on trial
for treason and entitled to all the privileges of parties accused of treason,
to escape the death penalty universally meted out as punishment for
,that offense."
It seems pertinent to observe that this statute not only permitted a
lighter punishment for those convicted of similar treasons, but enabled
the prosecution to obtain convictions that otherwise might not have
been possible had the death penalty been demanded.
(2) Seditious conspiracy.
"If two or more persons in any State or Territory, or in any place
subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, conspire to overthrow,
put down, or to destroy by force the Government of the United States,
or to levy war against them, or to oppose by force the authoi,,y thereof,
or by force to prevent, hinder, or delay the execution of any law of the
United States, or by force to seize, take, or possess any property of the
United States contrary to the authority thereof, they shall each be fined
not more than $5,000, or imprisoned not more than six years, or both.""
33. 18 U. S. C. § 4 (1934); drawn from Rav. STAT. § 5334 (Act of July 17,
1862, c. 195, 12 STAT. 590).
34. 26 Fed. Cas. No. 15,254 (C. C. N. D. Cal. 1863).
35. Id. at 23.
36. 18 U. S. C. § 6 (1934); drawn from Rav. STAT. § 5336 (Act of July 31,
1861, c. 33, 12 STAT. 284; Act of April 20, 1871, c. 22, 17 STAT. 13). See also 18
U. S. C. § 88 (1934).
[Vol. 5
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Of the many prosecutions had under this statute, the overwhelming
majority of those reported occurred either during the period of the Civil
War or the World War. Until the time of the original enactment of this
statute,-", there was no law making punishable treasonable conspira.ies
not consumnmated by an overt act, but the Civil War decisions licll Ihat
no overt act wvas needed under its provisions. :'  The point was apparelitlN
not raised again until the World War period, in which the colirts re-
iterated their position that no overt act was necessary.'"
Next for consideration are the developments in the field of political
offenses during the World War period. Shortly before the entry o" the
United States into that war, Congress enacted an act to punish persons
who make threats against the President of the United States:
"Any person who knowingly and willfully deposits or causes
to be deposited for conveyance in the mail or for delivery from
any post office or by any letter carrier any letter, paper, writing,
print, missive, or document containing any threat to take the life
of or to inflict bodily harm upon the President of the United
States, or who knowingly and willfully otherwise makes any such
threat against the President, shall upon conviction be fined not
exceeding $1,000 or imprisoned not exceeding five years, or
both. "
An examination of nine opinions handed down in prosecutions under
that Act, reveals a surprising conflict among the judges as to the legal
questions involved, although the constitutionality of the Act is never ques-
tioned.
In United States v. French,41 a demurrer was sustained because the
indictment alleged neither that the accused, in writing the offending
letter to another individual, intended that it be communicated to the
president. nor that it was ai fact so communicated.
42
37. 1861.
38. Charge to Grand Jury-Treason and Piracy, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,277
(C. C. D. Mass. 1861); Charge to Grand Jury-Treason, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,272(C. C. S. D. Ohio 1861).
39. Bryant v. United States, 257 Fed. 378 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919), cert. denied,
40 Sup. Ct. 117 (1919); Enfield v. United States, 261 Fud. 141 (C. C. A. 8th,
1919); Reeder v. United States, 262 Fed. 36 (C. C. A..St', 1919), c rt. denied,
252 U. S. 581 (1920).
40. Act of Feb. 14, 1917, c. 64, 39 STAT. 919 (1917), 18 U. S. C. § 89 (1934).
41. 243 Fed. 785 (S. D. Fla. 1917).
42. In form the letter was hardly intelligible. It claimed that the writer
could destroy a navy without a sound. Without directly threatening the President,
it said. "if the german people can pay $20,000.00 for Wilson . . . answer yes
." (by cutting certain shrubs). This could be construed as a solicitation
for employment as an assassin or terrorist, but the court intimated it thought
the writer might have been patriotically attempting to test the Americanism
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But in United States v. Jasick4 " a demurrer was overruled in a sim-
ilar prosecution where the indictment charged a verbal threat that "if
he got a chance he would shoot President Wilson." Holding that it was
no defense that the threat was conditioned on the defendant's ability
and that it was not communicated to the President, the court said:
"The purpose of the statute was undoubtedly, not only the
protection of the President, but also the prohibition of just such
statements. ..... The expression of su.h direful intentions
and desires, not only indicates a spirit of disloyalty to the nation
bordering upon treason, but is, in a very real sense, a menace to
the peace and safety of the country. It tends to create among the
anarchistic . . . a suggestion which may lead to most
harmful consequences. It arouses resentment and concern on the
part of patriotic citizens; and in general it constitutes a breach
of the peace and incitement to disorder and violence." 44
In Ragansky v. United States, 1 the court in affirming a conviction
for oral threats rejected as no defense the accused's contention that he
spoke in jest.4 In 'United States v. Stickrath,4 7 the indictment was for
saying "President Wilson ought to be killed.... If I had an op-
portunity I would do it myself." In overruling a demurrer the court
said that the motive of the speaker was immaterial and that it was not
necessary that the indictment should state in whose presence the threat
was made. But the next year, in United States v. Stobo," whether the
statement "The President ought to be shot and I would like to be the
one to do it." amounted to a threat was held to be a jury question, to be
considered in view of the surrounding circumstances. The indictment was
held bad, moreover, for failure to allege that the words were said within
the hearing of someone other than the speaker, since the purpose of the
Act was to curb such statements because of their tendency to incite the
bearers. The court expressly stated that the bill of particulars would
have cured this omission insofar as concerned the right of the accused to
have the charge sufficiently definite to enable him to set it up as a former
acquittal or conviction in the event of a later prosecution for the same of-
fense.
43. 252 Fed. 931 (E. D. Mich. 1918).
44. Id. at 933.
45. 253 Fed. 643 (C. C. A. 7th, 1918).
46. The court further weakened this rule by stating that the accused did
not allege that his hearers understood his words to be a joke, or that he intended
them so to understand.
47. 242 Fed. 151 (S. D. Ohio 1917).
48. 251 Fed. 689 (D. Dela. 1918).
[,Vol. 5
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Later in Pierre v. United States,49 an indictment similarly defective was
thrown out solely because the conviction thereunder could not have been
set up by the defendant as a former conviction in the event of a later prose-
cution for the same offense. Similarly, United States v. Metzdorf,'" reached
quite an opposite result from Clark v. United ,tates.' The Metzdorf
opinion sustained a demurrer to an indictment alleging that the accused
said "If I got hold of President Wilson I would shoot him." Tihe reason
for its decision was that Congress had the power to pass laws to protect
federal officials in their official capacities only and not as individuals,
and the indictment did not allege that the threats complained of were
spoken of President Wilson as an official, not merely of one Woodrow
Wilson whom the accused disliked personally.2 In the Clark case, the
words used did not include the official title at all, being merely "I wish
Wilson were in hell, and if I had the power I would put him there,"
but the conviction was affirmed.3
In Hall v. United States," the circuit court reversed a conviction
where the district court had permitted the indictment to charge violations
of both the Espionage Act and the statute punishing threats against the
President, evidence of violations of the latter statute being heard by the
jury before. convicting the defendant under the Espionage Act, a preju-
dicial error the occurrence of which in more placid times might be less
believable.'
The necessities of war, or at least the passions war engendered, re-
49. 275 Fed. 352 (C. C. A. 8th, 1921).
50. 252 Fed. 933 (D. M, at. 1918).
51. 250 Fed. 449 (C. C. A. 5th, 1918).
52. Recognizing that the statute itself had not expressly required than the
threats be against the President as an official rather than as an individual, the
court reasoned that it would presume Congress acted only within its authority,
and therefore referred only to threats of the former class. By such reasoning,
a person charged under a statute providing the death penalty for attempted
assassination of visiting diplomats could escape by proving he merely disliked
his victim personally; but the opposite consequence seems inescapable.
53. The offending statement in the Clark case had an additional, less
printable line, "Wilson is a wooden-headed son of a bit,.h." This was included
in the indictment although not in itself threatening, ?nd ;tlthough the statute
under which the prosecution took place did not outlaw defamatory words per se,
as the Espionage Act did. Possibly these words helped show intent, but very
likely they were far more prejudicial in effect, especially since the trial took
place in Texas, a state which at that time had a statute making the use of in-
sulting language toward a female relative of the slayer an adequate provocation
which would reduce a homicide to manslaughter. TEx. PEN. CODE (1925) art.
1248. (Repealed by Acts 1927, c. 274, § 3.) See TEx. STAT. (Penal Code, Vernon,
1936) art. 1257c.
54. 256 Fed. 748 (C. C. A. 4th, 1919).
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suited in the passage of the federal Espionage Act of June 15, 1917,1,1
which not only made punishable the divulging of information as to the
national defense, but also contained the more drastic provisions:
"See. 3. Whoever, when the United States is at war, shall
willfully make or convey false reports or false stateinets with
intent to interfere with the operation or success of the military or
naval forces of the United States or to promote the success of' its
enemies and whoever, when the United States is at war, sialI
willfully cause or attempt to cause insubordination, disloyalty,
mutiny, or refusal of duty, in the military or naval forces of the
United States, or shall willfully obstruct the recruiting or it-
listment service of the United States . . . shall be punished
by a fine . . . or imprisonment for not more than twenty
years, or both."
"See. 4. If two or more persons conspire to violate Ithe above
Act] and one . . . does any act to effect the object of the
conspiracy, each . . . shall be punished " .
Moreover, the Act made it a felony to send in the mails any ma-
terial containing matter in violation of any of the provisions of the Act.-
In United States v. Dernbowski,5' an indictment was quashed for
duplicity because its one count followed the wording of Section three,
the court holding that Section to state three distinct offenses and not
merely three different ways of committing the same offense. Usually.
however- objections to the sufficiency or form of the indictments met with
scant success.bQ Persons were convicted for attempting to obstruct en-
listment or cause insubordination, not only where they addressed inem-
bers of the armed forces, but where the audience contained men who were
required to register- since such men were subject to conscription."' Ii-
deed. it was said that even the presence of men eligible for service
was unnecessary; that it was enough if the acts were committed or words
spoken in a public place and to the public, with the intent to cause any
of the prohibited results. As almost any place could be a public place
and even one hearer might be sufficient, ;2 and the evil into .t would be
presumed from the words used, conviction actually required very little
in the way of technical elements of crime.
56. 40 STAT. 217 (1919), 50 U. S. C. 31 (1934).
57. Id. at 219, §§ 3, 4.
58. Id. at 230.
59. 252 Fed. 894 (E. D. Mich. 1918).
60. See United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); United
States v. Eastman, 252 Fed. 232 (S. D. N. Y. 1918); Sugar v. United States,
252 Fed. 79 (C. C. A. 6th, 1918).
61. Goldstein v. United States, 258 Fed. 908 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919) ; Coldwell
v. United States, 256 Fed. 805 (C. C. A. 1st, 1919).
62. United States v. Nearing, 252 Fed. 223 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
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Some of the most remarkable cases under Section three resulted from
the exhibition of a movie dealing with the American Revolution. In
addition to many unobjectionable historical scenes, the film showed the
Wyoming Valley Massacre, in which British soldiers were shown impaling
babies on bayonets, shooting women, and seizing helpless girls. Although
the accuracy of these scenes was not seriously questioned by the court,
the film was confiscated' and the producer convicted.14  As to the truth
of the film, the court said:
"History is history, and fact is fact. . . At the present time,
however, the United States is confronted with . . . the greatest
emergency . . in our history. There is now required . . . the
greatest amount of devotion to a common cause, the greatest amount of
co-operation . . . that can be conceived, and as a necessary conse-
quence no man should be permitted to . . . in any way detract from
the efforts which the United States is putting forth . . . Great Britian
is an ally -whatever occurred there [during the Revolution] is
written upon the pages of history and will have to stand, whomsoever may
be injured . . . by the . . . recollection of it. But this is no
time . . . for the exploitation of those things that may have the
tendency or effect of sowing dissension among our people or [creating]
want of confidence between us and our allies." 5
Even advising an eligible against volunteering for military service
might be an offense under the Act, although done in good faith. A
dictuntm in United States v. Nearing,"6 stated that such advice was priv-
ileged where given at the eligible's own request, or where given by a
near relative without a request, but not where given by a stranger whom
the eligible had not requested, the statute not recognizing" any right by
strangers "to intervene gratuitously in the decisions of [other] citizens."
By the Act of May 16, 1918, the first section quoted above was amend-
ed to make punishable the intentional obstruction of the sale of govern-
63. United States v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of *76", 252 Fed. 946
(S. D. Cal. 1917). That this meant a loss of over 8100,060 t' iUanocent stockholders
of the company who had known nothing of the objectionable scenes did not deter
the court.
64. Goldstein v. United States, 258 Fed. 908 (C. C. A. 9th, 1919), rehearing
denied, Oct. 14, 1919. Goldstein allegedly was not in good faith, however. A
controversy had arisen as to whether the film was offensive, so Goldstein had
exhibited it to government officials with the objectionable scenes omitted, then
inserted them again for public exhibition after obtaining official approval of the
expurgated film.
65. United States v. Motion Picture Film "The Spirit of '76", 252 Fed. 946,
947-948 (S. D. Cal. 1917).
66. 252 Fed. 223, 230 (S. D. N. Y. 1918).
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ment bonds. the incitement of disloyalty iii the military or naval forces,
the obstruction of recruiting or enlisting, the dishyal abuse of the gov-
ernment or the use of language intended to bring the Government or Con-
stitution of the United States into disrepute, etc. , This amendment has
been called the "edition Act of 1918," hut despite the far-reaehin"
nature of their provisions, both acts were upheld in a series of famous
cases, the first of which, however, involved only the 1917 Act.
In Schenck v. Unittd States,"8 decided in March, 1919,11 Justice Holmes
wrote the opinion for a unanimous Court upholding a conviction under
the 1917 Act although the strongest statements of the pamphlets mailed
by the accused were quotations from well known public men. The Court
said: ". . . in many places and in ordinary times the defendants in
saying all that was said in the circular would have been within their con-
stitutional rights. But the character of every act depends upon the cir-
cumstances in which it is done. . . The question in every case is
whether the words used are used in such circumstances . . . as to
create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the sub-
stantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent. When a a-
tion is at war many things that might be said in time of peace are such
a hindrance . that their utterance will not be endured.. ,,.o
In Debs v. United States,7 - which was decided but one week after
the Schenck case, a unanimous Court upheld Debs' conviction for ob-
structing and attempting to obstruct recruiting and enlistment, the only
overt act charged being a public address by the accused, most of which
was devoted to praise of the Socialist party, which the Court professed to
regard as innocent and unpunishable. Although the opinion relied on
the Schenck case in another connection, comments have generally termed
this decision a departure from the Schenek test although Justice Holmes
wrote both opinions.
67. May 16, 1918. c. 75, 40 STAT. 553-554. The 1918 amendment was repealed
and the 1917 Act reaffirmed, in Act of Mar. 3, 1921, 41 STAT. 1359, 50 U. S. C. §
33 (1934).
68. 249 U. S. 47 (1919).
69. The acts Schenck committed occurred before the passage of the 1918
amendment, but the Debs case, although decided only a week after the Schencle
case, arose after the 1918 amendment took effect, a fact ignored by most comments
upon these decisions.
70. This opinion prompted Heywood Broun to say, in the World-Telegram,
March 7, 1935, that even Justice Holmes' calm tolerance weakened once. "I have
always felt," says Broun, "that during the great war he lost touch for a time
with his own liberal philosophy. The bugles and the drums stirred in him old
memories and opened ancient wounds."
71. 249 U. S. 211 (1919).
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A rather extreme comment, written more than twelve years after the
two decisions, attributes to the Court an intentional abandonment of
the Sch.enck test in order to "get its man" in the Debs case.7 2  The same
writer states that the Debs case revived the old doctrine of constructive
treason, violating a great Anglo-American tradition of free expression of
political opinion. It must be admitted that the phrases used by Debs are
no more violent, if not less so, than the remarks made by Charles Sumner
in a public speech during the Mexican War in which he said "The MAVex-
ican War is an enormity . . base in its object . . atrocious
immoral . . a war of infamy........7 Even Debs'
courtroom confession that he opposed war would seem little basis for a
conviction when it is remembered that General LeClellan was nominated
for the presidency in 1864 on a platform condemning the Civil War, which
conflict was then at its height.7 4 In Abrams v. United States,75 decided
eight months after the Scheizok case, another conviction under the Act
was upheld, the offense consisting of the publication of I. W. W. and
"Revolutionist" pamphlets denouncing capitalism, urging world union
of workers, requesting munitions workers not to make bullets for use
against the Russian workers. The majority opinion held these pamphlets
counselled and were intended to rouse forcible resistance to the Federal
Government, holding the American form of government up to scorn, and
urging obstruction of American war activities. Brandeis joined in the
dissent by Holmes, the latter asserting that the "clear and present dan-
ger" test he had pronounced in the Schiezck case did not warrant the
Abrams conviction, and declaring that:
"Only the emergency that makes it immediately dangerous
to leave the correction of evil counsels to time warrants making
any exception to the sweeping command, 'Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.' "171
Still later, in an opinion of March, 1920, 77 the Court upheld several
convictions under the Espionage Act arising out of the publication of
72. Black, Debs v. The United States-A Judicial Milepost on the Road to
Absolutism (1932) 81 U. OF PA. L. REV. 160.
73. Id. at 175.
74. One of Debs' objectionable remarks concerned the conviction of Rose
Pastor Stokes, Debs saying she had done no more than he, and that if she were
guilty, so was he. Mrs. Stokes had at that time been sentenced to the penitentiary,
but was given a reversal a year after the Debs decision, thus substantiating in
part the allegations which Debs had made, but speaking even more eloquently of
the change of attitude commencing after the War ended.
75. 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
76. Ibid. But see Wigmore, Abrams v. U. S.: Freedom of Speech and Free-
dom of Thuggery in War Time and Peace-Time (1920) 14 ILL. L. REv. 539.
77. Schaefer v. United States, 251 U. S. 466 (1920).
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German language newspapers, the majority finding the defendants guilty
of false reports. Brandeis, in whose dissent Holmes concurred, objected
that the Schenck test did not support the convictions, and that the fal-
sification proved was little more than a misprint whereas only such "wil-
fully untrue statements . . . which might mislead public opinion
. . . or officials in the execution of the law . . . are made crimi-
nal, under any rational construction of the act."s
In Pierce v. United States,9 also decided in March, 1920, convivtions
of conspiracy under the Act were affirmed under circumstances which, as
outlined by the dissent,"' made the conviction rather extreme. The con-
spiracy charged dealt with the distribution of a socialist pamphlet which,
although blaming our entry into the war on Wall Street and J. P. Ior-
gan and seeking recruits to socialism, did not counsel forcible resistance
to the Government.s The dissent cited the Schenck case as contra and at-
tacked the finding of "false reports," insisting thai a conviction of that
offense not only required proof that the report was made with the in-
tent to produce the result which Congress sought to prevent but also re-
quired that:
(1) The report must be of something capable of being proved false in
fact.
(2) The report must be proved to be false.
(3) The report must be known by the defendant to be false when
made.8 2
The dissent stated that the defendants had withheld distribution of
the offending pamphlets until another prosecution involving the same
pamphlets but in another jurisdiction had resulted in a directed acquittal
on the ground that the pamphlets were not shown to be an attempt to
persuade men to disobey the law.83
78. Id. at 492, Brandeis continues, "The jury (which found these men
guilty) . . . must have supposed it to be within their province to condemn
men not merely for disloyal acts but for a disloyal heart; provided only that the
disloyal heart was evidenced by some utterance."
79. 252 U. S. 239 (1920).
80. Brandeis, J.; joined by Holmes, J.
81. The pamphlet is reprinted in full in the dissent.
82. Brandeis, J., in 252 U. S. at 255 (1920). Brandeis said that the only
false report made was the statement that it was an offense not to stand when
the national anthem was being played. Admitting this to be false and unfair,
Brandeis maintained it was not made with intent to interfere with the operation
of the military forces.
83. The situation is summarized by Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War
Time (1919) 32 HARv. L. REV. 932, at 965, "The courts have treated opinions as
statements of facts and then condemned them as false because they differed from
the President's speech or the resolution of Congress declaring war."
(Vol. 5
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Gilbert v. Minnesota,'" another 1920 opinion, sustained a conviction
under a Minnesota statute making it a gross misdemeanor to deter enlist-
ment in the military or naval forces of the United States or of Minnesota.
The defendant had made a speech attacking American participa-
tion in the war, assailing the lack of democracy in the Federal Government
and asserting that our war activity would have been ended in forty-
eight hours had capital been conscripted as well as men. Justice Holmes
concurred in the result, but Justice Brandeis found the statute infringing
on the exclusive legislative domain of the Federal Government and abridg-
ing freedom of speech. Moreover, he termed the statute not a war
measure but applicable in peacetime as well and forbidding the teach-
ing of pacifism even though futile and done in time of peace without
intent to obstruct. Without invoking the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice
Brandeis inferred that the statute violated it, too.
In Stilson v. United States,"5 decided in November, 1919, the Court up-
held convictions of defendants who were indicted on two conspiracy counts,
(one under the Espionage Act and the other under the Selective Service
Act), and whose convictions were under general verdicts. The second
count was not pressed, and Justices Brandeis and Holmes dissented on
the ground that one count not being sustained, the general verdict was
unsupportable, but the majority upheld the convictions nevertheless.
Before concluding this summary of the Espionage Act decisions, "
it is to be remembered that the Act was a war-time measure, dealing with
offenses committed during the war, and the convictions thereunder but
evidenced the emotional stress of the times and the extent of power which
the people suffered the government to exercise during the emergency
of war.
The stirring dissents of Justices Holmes and Brandeis in the later
decisions might be taken to represent the beginnings of the return to
normalcy, the reaction against war-time restriction, so symptomatic of
post-war days. Although these dissents largely relied on the fact that
there did not exist the "clear and present danger" set up as the test
in the Schenck case, they are themselves hardly reconcilable with the
84. 254 U. S. 325 (1920).
85. 250 U. S. 583 (1919).
86. See also Sugarman v. United States, 249 U. S. 182 (1919); United
States v. Krafft, 249 Fed. 919 (C. C. A. 3d, 1918) (public speaker convicted);




Missouri Law Review, Vol. 5, Iss. 2 [1940], Art. 2
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol5/iss2/2
180 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5
unanimous decision of the court in Frohiwerk v. United States,8 7 in which
Justice Holmes wrote the opinion affirming a conspiracy conviction based
on articles no more objectionable in content than those figuring in the
other cases. and holding unnecessary any allegation that false reports were
made or intended to be made, or that any specific means of carrying out
the conspiracy was agreed upon.
Assuming the publications in the later cases to be equal in violence
to those in the Schenck and Frohwerk cases, and this assumption seems
warranted from the reports, no other circumstance appears to prevent
the existence of that present danger relied upon in the earlier cases. The
offenses prosecuted in the later opinions occurred during the same period
of the war as those in the Schenck case, and it is as of the time of the
commission of the offense that the existence of the danger justifying the
enforcement of the statute is material from the standpoint of constitu-
tional principles. The conclusion seems justified, -however, that the
absence of such a danger at the time of the post-war opinions was never-
theless a material factor in Justice Holmes' estimate of the war-time
danger. -"
An example of the extreme lengths to which the Espionage Act was
applied. is foumc, in the case of Rose Pastor Stokes, a feminine opponent
of American entry into the War, and an advocate of "Internationalism."
The Kansas City Star had carried an article which stated that Mrs. Stokes,
although an opponent of war, was in support of the government and its
war program. In requesting a correction, Mrs. Stokes sent the Star a
signed letter in which she quoted its misleading statements and added:
"I am rot for the government. . . No government which is for the
profiteers can also be for the people, and I am for the people, while the
government is for the profiteers." The publication of this letter led to
her indictment and conviction in federal district court for attempting to
cause insubordination, obstructing enlistment, and conveying false re-
ports with intent to interfere with the military and naval forces. Sen-
tenced to serve ten years in prison, Mrs. Stokes appealed, finally having
her conviction set aside by the circuit court of appeals in 1920, the opin-
ion of the court"9 upholding the indictment but finding grounds for re-
versal in the instructions given the jury. As seen by the appellate court.
87. 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
88. Compare this peacetime perspective with Dean Wigmore's free speech
comments. supra note 76.
89. Stokes v. United States, 264 Fed. 18 (C. C. A. 8th, 1920). 17
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.Mrs. Stokes' words had been written of the government as it was oper-
ating at the time of her letter, in March, 1918, and her use of the word
"government" referred to the Wilson administration, but the trial court
had permitted the jury to decide whether she had meant that regime or
had referred to the American system of government ("the constitutional
government of 1787"). Since the latter was obviously not for the profiteers
and since she had not referred to it, the court held that her conviction of
making false statements was unsupportable since possibly not based on
a finding by the jury that the Wilson regime was not for the profiteers.
The constitutionality of the Espionage Act was not even raised in the
Stokes case, but comment as to its vitality in that instance is unnecessary. 0
Again, in United States v. Nagler,9" it was held that an indictment
stated an offense under the Espionage Act where it alleged that the de-
fendant had made "false statements with intent to interfere with the
. . . military" by his remarks, made during a drive for Y. M. C. A. and
Red Cross funds, that those organizations were private grafts and that
only fifteen percent of the money collected by them went to the soldiers
or was used for the purposes for which collected; that he would not con-
tribute to them, and that the munitions makers were running the war.
The court held that the organizations in question, although technically
and private and not government enterprises, were authorized by the gov-
ernment to do their work, and the false statements made concerning them
had an effect upon the effectiveness of the military forces. A law journal
comment of December, 1918,92 in approving the decision, said:
-.No doubt it will be a source of great satisfaction to most
people that the circulation of such vicious lies as were repeated by
[this] defendant . . . can be reached by criminal proceed-
ings".
In Granzow v. United States, ' the court agreed that, "while the
Red Cross is not itself within the term 'military and naval forces'
yet to cripple the Red Cross as operated in this war is to interfere with
such forces", so that statements which tended to destroy public confidence
90. Concerning the wisdom and effectiveness of the Act, see Chafee, Freedom
of Speech in War Time (1919) 32 HARV. L. REV. 932, 972: "Men have been im-
prisoned, but their words have not ceased to spread. . . . The mere publica-
tion of Mrs. Stokes' statement in the Kansas City Star . . . was considered
so dangerous - . . that she was sentenced to ten years in prison, and yet it
was repeated by every important newspaper in the country during the trial."
91. 252 Fed. 217 (W. D. Wis. 1918).
92. (1918) 17 MICH. L. REV. 186.
93. 261 Fed. 172 (C. C. A. 8th, 1919).
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in the Red Cross. thus interfering with voluntary contributions to that
organization, would be within the Espionage AM. Such langpiage is more
suprising since in an opinion rendered in November, 1919, a year after
the armistice, than similar language in the Nagler decision a year pre-
viously would have been, but it must be added that the Gravzoir' opinion
ended in a reversal of the conviction because of two errors:
First, the improper admission of a financial statement of the Red
Cross, with itemized statements of receipts and expenditures.
Second, the striking out of testimony of witnesses to the defendant's
remarks, such testimony being offered for the defendant apparently to
show that. his words had no successful effect upon his hearers.
The opinion concluded,
"The statute does not make it a crime to intend to obstruct,
or to attempt to obstruct, but to intentionally obstruct. Where
the utterance is calculated to result in obstruction, and is uttered
under conditions which would naturally so result, there is a pre-
sumption that such a result followed, but that presumption is
reb uttable."
In Schoborg v. United States,4 three prominent members of a Ger-
man community at Covington, Kentucky, were convicted under the Es-
pionage Act because of words "supporting the cause of the enemy."
The words- were spoken by the defendants in the privacy of one's shoe
shop and, although favorable to German war activity, did not partake of
the nature of a plot or of attempts to persuade anyone else to that cause.
The evidence was obtained by a dictaphone installed by a voluntary as-
sociation of patriots. In affirming the convictions, the circuit court of
appeals held that the effect of these private conversations, even in the
absence of plots or plans to help Germany, "would be to aggravate, if not
cause, an extremity and recklessness in the opposition to the war which
would be an incitement to direct obstruction and injury. .
Under this decision, private conversations between old friends, with-
out any evidence of a plot or conspiracy, became criminal upon mention
of forbidden subjects-almost a step toward primitive taboos. Actually,
under the influence of the mass feeling of the time, being of German de-
scent and bearing a "Germanic" name became in many instances almost
a prima facie case of unlawful activity," more than sufficient for abuse by
local four hundred pereenters.
94. 264 Fed. 1 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920), cert. denied, 253 U. S. 494 (1920).
95. Examples occurred in almost every locality. Even post offices were
[ Vol. 5
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To complete the picture of war-time restrictions on freedom of ex-
pression, reference must be made to the direct encroachments on freedom
of the press during the World War. Theoretically, emergencies may
change what is reasonable but do not change the validity of constitution-
al provisions. Arguments that war may suspend those priviliges have
been too often denied to require citation here. It is agreed that:
"Freedom of speech, being a constitutional guaranty, cannot
be abridged in times of stress and strain any more than when the
country is at peace. '96
However, look briefly at the record:
On April 2, 1917, an "Espionage Bill" was introduced into the Sen-
ate, providing punishment for the publication of information in violation
of presidential regulations. The bill expressly provided it was to be for
the duration of the war only, and not to interfere with freedom of dis-
cussion or criticism of the- Government. Nevertheless it was strongly
protested as an unconstitutional abridgment of freedom of the press and
as setting up government censorship. The bill was defeated but practical-
ly the same control was gained by the provisions of title twelve of the
Espionage Act which made it a felony to send unmailable matter through
the mails. Postmasters began to exercise a practical censorship function
by holding suspected periodicals until their transmission in the mails was
approved by the postal department.97
When Postmaster Patten of New York withheld the August, 1917, is-
sue of Masses, a radical publication, its publishers protested and eventual-
ly secured an injunction on the ground that the passages objected to did
not counsel resistance to the law and were, therefore, not in violation of
the Act.9 A stay was granted by the circuit court of appeals,99 and the
publication of the September issue resulted in its exclusion and a ruling
by the latter court °00 that such exclusion was proper, that the Act did not
violate freedom of the press, that the exercise of discretion by a postmaster
in excluding materials he considered unmailable under the Act would
not be interfered with by the courts unless clearly wrong, and that it was
sufficient ground for exclusion that the periodical had a reasonable ef-
changed from German to American names, for example: Corn, Oklahoma,
formerly Korn.
96. Note, The Espionage Cases (1919) 32 HAav. L. REv. 417.
97. Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of the Press in War Time: The Espion-
age Act (1919) 17 Mwic. L. REV. 621.
98. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
99. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 245 Fed. 102 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
100. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (C. C. A. 2d, 1917).
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feet the encouragement of resistance to a law although it did not directly
counsel resistance. This decision overruled the trial court which, speak-
ing through Justice Learned Iland, had held that:
"If one stops short of' urging upon others that it is their
duty or their interest to resist the law . . . [he] should not
be held to have attempted to caose its violation. [Otherwise] every
political agitation . . apt to create a seditious temper is
illegal. I am confident . . . Congress had no such revolution-
ary purpose in view."'"
The opinion also praised the traditional freedom of the American
press, and conceded that -there was no distinction between what constituted
unmailable matter in an indictment under the Act and in exclusion from
the mails under the same Act, but pointed out that the Act did not for-
bid publication of such matter, or even its transmission in interstate com-
nierce, but merely denied its carriage in the United States mail.
The Trading with the Enemy Act, October 6, 1917,102 made it unlaw-
ful to send unmailable matter in interstate commerce, thus extending the
denial of circulation beyond the limits approved in the Masses case. How-
ever. conceding that Congress had the right to penalize the publications
under the Espionage Act, it could not only exclude them from the mails,
but also from interstate commerce, and, still more drastically, from cir-
culation even within the confines of a state.
"There can be no right of circulation for that which there is
no right to utter."' 0
Presidential proclamations determined who and what constituted
"enemies" within the Act, and each proclamation broadened its scope.10 4
Moreover the Act is still in effect,' 01 but there are no prosecutions under it
because there do not exist any "enemies" at the present time. With the
resumption of hostilities, this statute is ready for use, still capable of fur-
ther extensions.
A resume of the foregoing war-time federal enactments reveals that
the trend has not been simply that in each succeeding war the amount of
restrictions has been increased, since the Mexican War did not have leg-
islation comparable to the original Sedition Act, and the Spanish-Amer-
ican War did not engender legislation of this nature to the extent of
101. Masses Pub. Co. v. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540 (S. D. N. Y. 1917).
102. Act of Oct. 6, 1917, c. 106, 40 STAT. 411 (1919).
103. Carroll, supra note 97, at 639.
104. See digest of proclamations and decisions, 50 U. S. C. A. pp. 189-311
(1928).
105. Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 281 Fed. 804 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
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the Civil War decades before, although the World War saw the extension
of the scope of such acts far beyond the limits set during any of the pre-
ceding periods. Nor is it only the size of the war which determines such
enactments. The World War was less important than the Civil War,
both in proximity of the civilian population to the battlefields, and in the
number of Americans seeing active service. It might be that people have
but lately come to feel the big-business aspect of war which requires a
unified and harmonious control similar to the control exercised over com-
plex industrial enterprises, or that the modern growth of population and
increase in effectiveness of communication and transportation facilities
have heightened the interdependence of the people. Certainly closer com-
munication has made possible the quicker and more thorough spread of
information (or propaganda) which means more intensive development
of widespread attitudes or emotional feelings, including the realization of
danger, actual or imaginary, and the growth of patriotic fervor, hatred,
or other attitudes that makes possible such enactments and their enforce-
ment. So, in the excitement of the war period, many prosecutions were
brought and convictions sustained for threats against the president, but
in recent years that statute, though still upon the statute books, has be-
come virtually a dead letter with respect to the types of "threats" so
vigorously prosecuted then.
The foregoing statutes have been called "war-inspired", and it is
true that it has generally required a period of actual conflict for such
laws to develop. However, since it is the growth of beliefs (or prejudices)
which cause such legislation, the actual source is rather the conditions
giving rise to the fears, jealousies, or loyalties upon which such attitudes
rest. Therefore, if conditions exist which arouse widespread fear of a
threat to cherished institutions, the resulting popular opinion will enact
Ihe required legislation, just as though a conflict were in progress. So,
convictions under war-time enactments may be had during times of peace
when fears are widespread against communism, fascism, or other unpop-
ular revolutionary ideas. Thus far, however excited the people of some
of the states have become over the prevalence of "foreign" political doc-
trines. the anxiety has not become sufficiently strong the country over to
result in much federal legislation on the point. In 1935 Congress saw a
large number of such measures introduced, but none of them became law,
although one passed the Senate and another was reported with amend-
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ments in the House.10 6 Subsequent attempts thus far have fared no bet-
ter.
MNIISCELLANEOUS FEDERAL POLITICAL OFFENSES
The foregoing discussion has sought to avoid those purely military
offenses 07 which are applicable only to members of the armed forces rather
than to people generally. Similarly, little attention is given the draft stat-
utes and other war-time enactments which operate only during war and
concern only military objectives. Such statutes are governed more by
rules of military expediency than by general constitutional principles.
They may be invoked despite theoretical personal rights, provided that
the dominant governing group considers them acceptable as instruments
of policy. They support the hypothesis of pragmatic constitutionality in
too over-simplified a way for illustrative use.
The history of compulsory military service in this country is ade-
quately reviewed in the Selective Draft Law Cases,108 in which it is pointed
out that in the War of 1812 the compulsory draft was first suggested for
this Government. but opposition developed preventing its enactment; that
the M1exican War did not require one, but that in 1863 the Civil War Draft
Act -decreed that all males between twenty and forty.-f e were subject to
the call to arms. The Spanish-American War did not necessitate conscrip-
tion. The Selective Draft Act,'00 enacted during the World War, was an
attempt by the use of appropriate words to get away from the idea of con-
scription, but still achieve the same effect. In upholding this Act as con-
stitutional. and not infringing on personal rights, freedom of religion or
state's rights, and not being involuntary servitude, the Court conveniently
disregarded troublesome legal objections, and concluded:
"Finally, . . . we are unable to conceive upon what
theory the exaction by government from the citizen of the per-
formance of his . . . noble duty of contributing to the de-
fense . . . and honor of the nation, as the result of a war de-
clared by [Congress] . . . can be said to be . . . invol-
untary servitude. ... "" 0
106. These bills are discussed in (1935) 35 COL. L. REv. 917-927.
107. 41 STAT. 800-806 (1921), 10 U. S. C. A. §§ 1526-1568 (1927), deal with
military offenses, principally misconduct of officers and men. Id. § 1554: "Any
person who in time of war shall be found lurking or acting as a spy in or about
any fortification . . . of the United States, or elsewhere, shall be tried by
a general court-martial . . . and shall, on conviction thereof, suffer death."
108. 245 U. S. 366 (1918) (eight cases).
109. May 18, 1917, c. 15, 40 STAT. 76 (1919).
110. 245 U. S. 366, 390 (1918).
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The Court might have well added,
"The argument needs only to be stated to refute itself."
The ease with which the Court in The Draft Cases evaded various Con-
stitutional objections had a counterpart in the prosecutions of persons
obstructing the Draft. Some of these have already been mentioned, but
an additional instance is illuminating. In United States v. Bergdoll,''' the
defendants, including 'Mrs. Bergdoll, were convicted of conspiracy to aid
soldiers in the military service in deserting. In fact, the "soldiers" had
never enlisted, but had been drafted and without even reporting for
duty had automatically become soldiers at the end of a prescribed num-
ber of days. In refusing a motion for a new trial, the court pointed this
out, asserting that it was not conscription, but universal service, a ma-
chinery merely existing to select the best fitted from those volunteering.
All the people had volunteered; all had placed themselves voluntarily at
the disposal of their country, to whatever service called. In other words,
a pacifist became a volunteer by legislative fiat. The opinion nowhere
mentioned that Mrs. Bergdoll was the mother of the "soldiers" she helped
desert. The Supreme Court never had to pass on the question, partly be-
cause of the leniency of the trial court. M~rs. Bergdoll was sentenced to
serve a year and a day in the federal penitentiary and was fined $5000.
but it was provided that the prison sentence should be remitted if the
fine were paid by the end of the court term. Mrs. Bergdoll brought error.
but her writ was dismissed because she had paid the fine (at the last min-
ute) and had, therefore, discharged her sentence, the questions involved
becoming moot."' -
While not a criminal proceeding, the libelling of enemy ships under
the war-time prize statutes has provided some interesting pronouncements.
This was particularly true during the Civil War period when the prop-
erty of other United States citizens could be seized as prize. In United
States v. The 8chooner Sally Years,": a schooner owned by Virginians
and manned by them sailed for Barbadoes before the war began, and was
captured upon her return to Baltimore, her destination. The master, a
part owner, and his crew all knew nothing of the War, and protested their
loyalty to the Federal Government, promising to support it against their
native states. The court held the ship lawful prize, being enemy prop-
erty. Said the court:
111. 272 Fed. 498 (E. D. Pa. 1921).
112. Bergdoll v. United States, 279 Fed. 404 (C. C. A. 3d, 1922).
113. 6 D. C. 36 (1864).
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"The laws of war may appear harsh . . . [but] were
war to be carried on in any other way it would soon languish into
effeminacy . . . [!] The citizen of Virginia whose vessel is
found upon the high seas, is all enemy so far as the fate of his
vessel is concerned, although he . .. denounce the wicked-
ness [of Secession] and acknowledge a paramount allegiance to
the [Federal] Government. lie is an enemy by reason of his resi-
dence. ".114
In Unitcd States v. The Allegheny,"5' a ship belonging to a New Orleans
resident was condemned, although the owner professed himself loyal. Nor
did the fact that New Orleans was occupied by federal troops alter the
case, since the remainder of the state of Louisiana was held by Confed-
erates. The court concluded:
"Although by law we are bound to declare a sentence of for-
feiture. the secretary of the treasury has power to relieve. And, as
we are satisfied of the inflexible loyalty [of the owner], we recom-
mend that it be remitted by the secretary upon payment of costs.
Decree accordingly." 116
The difference in result in the two cases, if not explained on the basis
of the difference in the personalities of the judges, might be accounted for
by assuming that of owner of the Sally Mears had not proved his loyalty,
the court avoiding the questions of proof and evidence by stating that
his loyalty was immaterial. In the other case, the loyalty of the owne-
not being doubted, the stringency of the ruling was softened by recom-
mending remission of the forfeiture.
The doctrine of these cases, that a citizen could become an enemy
merely by reason of his residence elsewhere in the union, and that his
property could be confiscated despite his continued loyalty, seems very
extreme. It is not entirely inconceivable, however, that the future might
see additional attempts to impose statutory penalties on persons, irrespec-
114. Ibid. Accord: The Sally Magee, 21 Fed. Cas. Nos. 12,259 and 12,260(S. D. N. Y. 1863); The Prize Cases, 2 Black 635 (U. S. 1862). The Peterhoff,
19 Fed. Cas. No. 11,024 (S. D. N. Y. 1863), upheld the seizure as prize, of a
cargo belonging to a naturalized citizen who, living in Texas when that statejoined the Confederacy, promptly fled to Mexico where he established a business.
Deeming him an enemy by virtue of his residence, the court held that all evidence
as to his personal loyalty was immaterial. The Supreme Court reversed this
ruling, saying that its own holdings that persons residing in rebel states at any
time during the Civil W"ar must be considered enemies, did not apply ". . . to
persons faithful to the Union, who have escaped from those States, and have
subsequently resided in the loyal States, or in neutral countries. Such citizens
of the United States lost no rights as citizens by reason of temporary and con-
strained residence in the rebellious portion of the country." The Peterhoff, 5
Wall. 28, 60 (U. S. 1866).
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tive of personal guilt, solely on the basis of the region of domicile or res-
idence."17
OFFENSES AGAINST -NEUTRALITY
From a very early period in the history of this nation federal stat-
utes have defined several offenses against neutrality. 118 These statutes have
survived through the years with relatively little change,"' existing today
in the form of several distinct offenses, all referring to acts done within
the jurisdiction of the United States, but only one requiring that the
defendant be a United States citizen. These offenses 2 0 include:
(a) Accepting a commission to serve a foreign country in war
against any other country or people with whom the United States is at
peace.' 2'
(b) Enlisting, or hiring the enlisting, or going beyond the jurisdic-
tion of the United States for the purpose of enlisting, in the service of
any foreign power.'
2
(c) Arming any vessel against a friendly power.
(d) Augmenting the armaments of any foreign armed vessel when
this country is at peace with any power with which such country is at
war.
(e) The organization of, or furnishing money for, any military
expedition against any foreign power with whom the United States is at
peace.
Prosecutions under these statutes have not been uncommon, having
occurred in the late eighteenth century where French ships were outfitted
in American ports to raid British shipping, 2 with subsequent proseeu-
117. Several southern states have statutes permitting recovery against the
county by the representative of any lynched person, such statutes being a step
short of a mulct of the citizens severally. Nazi Germany's multi-million dollar
fine on Jews for the murder of a nazi underling is an extreme example of the
latter.
118. See Act of April 20, 1818, c. 88, 3 STAT. 447 (1850). Even before thisAct, such offenses existed and were prosecuted. See Ex parte Needham, 17 Fed.
Cas. No. 10,080 (C. C. D. Pa. 1817); United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. No.
14,694a (C. C. D. Va. 1807) (expedition against Mexico).
119. A principal change in the statute deletes the words "high misdemeanor"
and makes the offenses felonies.
120. REV. STAT. §§ 5281-5286 (1878); 18 U. S. C. §§ 21-25 (1934) (in the
order named).
121. Applies only to citizens of the United States.
122. Amendment of May 7, 1917. c. 11, 40 STAT. 39, excepts citizens of
foreign countries at war with a country with which the United States is at war,
except where they get United States citizens to enlist in the service of a foreign
country. In other words, this permitted citizens of the Allied countries to get
their nationals in the United States to enlist in the armies of their homelands.
123. In United States v. Guinet, 2 Dall. 321 (U. S. 1795), the defendant
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tions arising from the case of pre-Civil War filibustering expeditions to
Cuba. 12 4 of contemplated invasions of Canada during the Civil War pe-
riod. of fitting out ships in New York for the use of Spain during that
country's war with Cuba, -'2 1 or where ships were fitted out for use by
Mexico against Texas,12-- or where aid was extended to Mexican revolu-
tionaries against the Carranza government which was not then officially
recognized by the United States.12 Filibustering expeditions to Cuba
in 1895 again resulted in prosecutions and convictions, some of which were
reversed on appeal.
In Wiborg v. United States,12 1 the Supreme Court reversed several
convictions on the theory that the various members of the expedition were
not bound together for concerted action under definite leadership, but
consisted only of various individuals with a common resentment against
Spain and each willing to go to C-dba to fight. The conviction of the cap-
tain of the ship was alone affirmed, Justice Harlan dissenting. The de-
velopment of a widespread conviction that Spain was oppressing the Cubans
may have influenced the Court in adopting such a narrow construction of
the statute in that case. This seems possible especially since such a con-
struction did not prevent successful prosecutions in the second decade of
the- next century, against German sympathizers attempting to cripple
England. It seems significant that the reported cases show several con-
victions and adverse rulings against German sympathizers who sought to
was convicted of violating the federal statute prohibiting the arming of a vessel
to war against a friendly power. The defendant had armed a French ship in
Philadelphia to prey upon British shipping, the United States at that time being
at peace with both powers. In upholding the conviction the Supreme Court
pointed out that this was the first prosecution under the statute. A treaty between
the United States and France had expressly made it illegal for other powers to
use American ports in outfitting ships to war against the French, so it was
contended that by implication the French were to be permitted to use the ports in
arming French ships. It was also contended that no action would lie against
Americans enlisting to fight for France. The opinion concedes that this inter-
pretation had received some support, the Boston grand jury having refused to
indict persons who had so aided the French, but notes that the president had
taken the contrary view and had this statute passed to apply to all belligerents.
That popular opinion had favored aiding the French and, but for the folly of the
French envoy Genet, might have achieved that end, see BASSETT, THE FEDERALIST
SYSTEM, 1789-1801 (1906), pp. 105-112.
124. United States v. O'Sullivan, 27 Fed. Cas. No. 15,975 (S. D. N. Y. 1851):
Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 Fed. Cas. Nos. 18,265, 18,266 and
18.267.
125. Charge to Grand Jury-Neutrality Laws, 30 Fed. Cas. No. 18,264 (N. D.
N. Y. 1866).
126. 13 Op. Att'y Gen. 177 (1869).
127. 3 Op. Att'y Gen. 739 (1841).
128. De Orozco v. United States, 237 Fed. 1008 (C. C. A. 5th, 1916).
129. 163 U. S. 632 (1896).
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hurt England by bombing Canada's Welland Canal, 11° encouraging natives
of India to return to that country and foster insurrection against the
British,1 3' or seeking to disrupt the arms trade between this country and
various Allied power,13 2 but reveal practically no prosecution of British
sympathizers. Conceding that not all efforts to enforce the statutes re-
sulted in prosecutions, and that not all prosecutions were reported, the
reported cases still reveal a vast disparity between prosecutions of Allied
sympathizers, as compared to prosecutions of German adherents. In the
principal case reported of prosecutions for violations in the interest of the
Allies, six of the eight defendants who were indicted for procuring British
subjects to go to England for enlistment in His Majesty's forces, won a
directed acquittal in the lower court, 13' and the circuit court of appeals re-
versed the convictions of the only two convicted.2 4 The trial had been
based on an agreed statement of facts, without other evidence, but the
action of the judge in directing a -verdict of guilty against the two de-
fendants was held by the latter court to constitute a flagrant invasion of
their constitutional right to jury trial. The convictions had occurred in
3915, the reversals in 1917, antedating by only three months the statute
exempting from prosecution activities of this nature. 35
Is it unreasonable to conclude that sympathy for the Allied cause, and
growing resentment against the Germans, played a part in the adverse de-
cisions against pro-German offenders, and the dearth of prosecutions against
Allied workers? The world famous Lafayette Escadrille consisted largely
of Americans who necessarily violated the statute in joining that organ-
ization.1 6
In more recent days, little was done to prosecute Americans who went
130. United States v. Tauscher, 233 Fed. 597 (S. D. N. Y. 1916) (demurrer
to indictment, on ground that defendants had no organization but had in common
only their hatred of England, was overruled).
131. United States v. Chakraberty, 244 Fed. 287 (S. D. N. Y. 1917); Jacobsen
v. United States, 272 Fed. 399 (C. C. A. 7th, 1920) (the acts complained of took
place in 1915; conviction was sustained in 1920), cert. denied, 256 U. S. 703
(1920).
132. United States v. Bopp, 237 Fed. 283 (N. D. Cal. 1916) (motion by the
prosecution to consolidate indictment for restraint of trade, under Sherman Act,
with an indictment charging an offense against neutrality).
133. United States v. Blair-Murdock Co., 228 Fed. 77 (N. D. Cal. 1915).
134. Blair v. United States, 241 Fed. 217 (C. C. A. 9th, 1917), cert. denied,
244 U. S. 655 (1917) (the defendants vainly appealed from that portion of
the decision ordering a new trial).
135. See note 122, szipra. See also Mead v. United States, 257 Fed. 639
(C. C. A. 9th, 1919) (convicted for attempting to dissuade recruits of the Cana-
dian army).
136. See articles in The Nation, vol. 105, pp. 33-34; Scribners, vol. 63, pp.
514-529, and other periodicals of the same period.
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to fight and fly under the banner of Loyalist Spain. The Congressional
inquiry which heard testimony from Bert Acosta on his return from that
front was apparently not followed by prosecutions. 37
The development of the Chinese-Japanese War in the last few years
have aroused principally passive interest except for the extra-legal in-
formal embargo of munitions to Japan, but it is submitted that if sym-
pathy for China and ill-feeling against Japan continue to grow, without
any declaration of war, the activities of those who seek financial support
for China, and the voluntary enlistment of persons within the jurisdiction
of this country, will meet little determined prosecution. This will be even
more true as regards pro-Allied workers, if the current European war
continues and our sympathies increasingly outweigh our determination
to remain strictly neutral.
Admittedly the statutes defining offenses against neutrality are de-
sirable attempts to avoid embroiling this country in foreign conflicts, but
in this class of offenses the realization of the dangers of the prohibited
activities may not come until feeling has gone past the point where re-
straint is eonsidered- reasonable or desirable. Ironically enough, it is pos-.
sible that the very offenders whose activities lead this country into the
evils sought to be avoided might escape prosecution because the resulting
change of opinion would make them heroes, or at least comrades iii arms
against the common enemy.
[To be concluded]
137. According to an Associated Press dispatch from Washington, D. C.
dated September 2, 1939, as reported in The Spokane Spokesman-Review,
September 3, 1939, p. 1, "Available records (in Washington, D. C.) show no
convictions on charges of violating the statute, resulting from participation by
American soldiers in the Spanish Civil War."
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